IDTIC
To formalize our idea of approximating a two-person zero-sum game of incomplete information by its subgames, we introduce what we shall call a game structure. A game structure is a system of the form (fI,U,rjn,.n"mn-.
• Here fK = (CI,BP) is a probability space, U = (Uij : i = 1,...,Mj = 1,...,N) is a matrix of random variables on Q (the payoff matrix), and ljn and On are sub-o-fields of the a-field B such that I~m+1 D Tm and On+1 D O . We put P = r. = the a-field generated by Cm, = C. = the a-field generated by U On.
For m,n = 1,2 ..... -, let Gmn be the two-person, zero-sum game in which a strategy for player I is an 1m-measurable a: Ql -> SM, and a strategy for player 1 is a 
IJ
Thus in the game Gmn, rm and On embody the information available to I and II, respectively. If Pm and On are finite, then Gmn is a finite approximation to the game G = By standard minimax theorems [Sion] , each game Gmn (and a fortiori G) has a saddle point. Let Vmn denote the value of the game Gm to player I, and let V -V....
If rFm and On are finite, then the game Gmn is, at least in principle, solvable by finite methods. The question we shal study is : To what extent is an optimal strategy for Gmn a useful substitute for an optimal strategy for G? An ideal result along these lines would be
(1) Fix e > 0. Suppose that, for mn = 1,2,..., amn is an optimal strategy for I in Gmn. Then, for all sufficiently large m and n, a n m is an e-optimal strategy for I in G.
As we shall see, (1) is, alas, in general false. The best we can do is a weaker version of(l) (Theorem 1), and a special case of (1) (Theorem 2). We shall state these --------theorems presently. For a strategy a for player I in the game G, let Van(a) = i~f r(a,3), where 0 ranges over On-measurable strategies for II. (Thus if ca is tr-measurable, then Valn(a) is the value to I of the strategy a in the game Gmn.) We shall write VaG(a) for Val (a).
Theorem 1. For m,n = 1,2..., suppose that a n l is an optimal strategy for player I in Gmn, and that ]m and Gn are finite a-fields. Then lim Lrn Vao(aml n ) = V.
m->o n->-Moreover, this convergence is uniform in the choices ct n of optimal strategies, i.e., player I in Grm.
Theorem 2 says that, under an additional hypothesis, (1) does hold. This hypothesis, which we shall call (M), is a version of the "continuity of information" assumption first used in [Milgrom-Weber] . (M) says roughly that the joint probability on anu 5 is absolutely continuous with respect to the product probability on r x 0. A precise statement of (M) will be found in Sec. 2. In Sec. 2, we shall prove all of these various claims.
Section 2. Results.
We first present an example which shows that assertion (1) of the introduction does not hold in general.
Example: A game structure in which (1) fails.
Let Ql be the interval [0,1) with Lebesgue measure, M=N=2, and the payoff We shall next prove Theorems I and 2. We first require a series of lemmas. Our first lemma is a special case of Theorem 2 of [Blackwell-Dubins] .
Lemma 2.1 Let (Xk) be a uniformly bounded sequence of random variables, and suppose that Xk --> X, a.s. as k-->-. Then E(Xk I Gk) -> E(XI 0 ) a.s.
as k -->...
Our second lemma computes Valn(a).
Lemnma 2.2 Fix a strategy a for I in G, and fix n c{1,2,...,-.
Define the random variable t by:
= the j e ( 12,...,N) which minimizes E( Uijai IO).
In case of a tie, for definiteness, take the least such j. Then , for all strategies P for II in Oag,
Ci)
E(Z .U 1 ai) £ , so
I
(ii) Valn(a) = E( nin E( Uij aiI On)) j I Proof: (i) immediately implies (ii), so we prove (i). Let P be a sntegy for 11 in 
Inl .>_ n->oo
(ii) lirn Vmn = V.
Proof : Fix n, and let a be an optimal strategy for I in G,,n. Now for m 1,2,...9 put am = E(a lrm). Thus a is a legal, though likely not optimal, strategy for I in Gmn. the inequality directly above, we infer li Vmn -V,.n. By symmetry, we also have lira Vmn = Vm. forallm. This proves (i). Finally, it is easy to see that
Vn.. < Vn <5 V-.n. Claimn (ii) now follows by letting m n ->,,
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof Lcf Theorem 1 : Suppose that a m n is an optimal strategy for player I in G, for m,n = 1,2,.... We claim that, for m -1,2,.. "moreover" clause in Theorem 1, let (emn) be a sequence of numbers which converges to 0 as m,n --> -. For all m,n, note that there exists am n e A(m,n) such that
The "moreover" clause ae A(m.n) follows at once.
We now consider Theorem 2. We must first discuss hypothesis (M).
F x 0 is the o-field on il x Ql generated by sets of the form S x T, where S E r and T E. Let Q and R be the probability measures on (L-x fQ,P x 0 ) deffined by Q(A) = I(co : (6,co)eA )) and
R(A) =JJ ( ) A) I P(dw) P(dTj)
for AEPxG .
We now state assumption (M). 
2.1, (i) implies (ii).
Next, note that we may assume without loss of generality that Z is memable in P v G (the -field generated by U 0).This is because E( XkZI ) = E( Xk'E( Z I v )I), so we may replace Z by E(Z I v 0) if necessary. We shall therefore prove (i), assuming that Z is P v G -measurable.
Since Z is F v 0 -measurable, there exist a bounded 'P-measurable random variable k, a bounded G-measurable random variable t and a bounded, Borel measurable function f : R x R --> R such that Z = fa'.).
By (M) and the Rador,-Nikodym theorem, there exists a bounded function Sf x fl -> R such that, for all A ]x, P({ c: (co,co) A )) =JA g(co,i1)P(dco)P(dT1).
It follows by standard mnvthods that, for any vector X of r-measurable random variables, any vector Y of 0-measurable random variables, and any Borel-measurable h : R 2 --> R, we have
Now by (*) we hjve
Since, by assumption, Xk --> X.. weakly, we have E(Xk Z I 0) (T) -> E(X.. Z I0) (Ti) a.s., as desired.
In exact analogy to lemma 2.3, we have Lemma 2.6 Assume that (M) holds. If (dk) is a sequence of strategies for I in G which converges weakly to a strategy c, then (i) for fixed n = 1,2,..., -, Valn(cak) --> Valn(a), and (ii) Valk(ak) --> ValG(a) as k--> ,.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose that ad~n is an optimal strategy for player I in Gmn, for all finite m and n. We shall prove that every sequence (mk,nl) of pairs of integers such that mk -> and nk --> a-has a subsequence (m'k,n'k) such that On the other hand, since (a k) converges weakly to a, by lemma 2.6(i),
ValG(cxk) --> ValC;(a) = V as k -> --. Uniformity follows just as in the proof of Theorem 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
